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Abstract 
This paper investigates the instantaneous and dynamic effects of ECB forward guidance 
announcements on the term structure of private short-term interest rate expectations. We 
estimate the static and dynamic impact of forward guidance on private agents’ expectations 
about future short-term interest rates using a high-frequency methodology and an ARCH 
model, complemented with local projections. We find that ECB forward guidance 
announcements decrease most of the term structure of private short-term interest rate 
expectations, this being robust to several specifications. The effect is stronger on longer 
maturities and persistent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After the European Central Bank (ECB) cut the main refinancing operations rate towards its 
effective lower bound (ELB) in 2010, forward guidance became one of the only tools 
available to provide monetary accommodation and support for market participants’ 
anticipation of a sustained period of low interest rates (Eggertson and Woodford, 2003), 
together with liquidity provisions and asset purchases. “The Governing Council expects the key 
interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.” With this 
statement pronounced on July 4th 2013 after the meeting of ECB Board of Governors, Mario 
Draghi adopted this new communication strategy. On January 9th 2014, Mario Draghi 
reinforced the use of this communication policy: “we firmly reiterate our forward guidance that 
we continue to expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended 
period of time”. This paper aims to investigate the impact of these forward guidance 
announcements on private short-term interest rate expectations using a high-frequency 
identification and an ARCH model, estimated both in a static fashion and with local 
projections à la Jorda (2005) for measuring dynamic effects. 
 
Because long-term interest rates – a key determinant of private decisions – depend on 
expected short-term interest rates plus a term premium, central banks over the last decades 
have enhanced transparency of their actions and communication to the public in order to 
better signal future policy decisions, shape private expectations and optimise their policy 
outcomes (see e.g. Geraats, 2002; Woodford, 2005; King, Lu and Pasten, 2008, Reis, 2013). The 
question of whether central bank communication has been successful to affect financial 
markets or to help predict policy decisions has given rise to an abundant literature surveyed 
by Blinder et al. (2008). However, the question of its transmission mechanism and why 
central bank communication affects private beliefs remains a much more open question. 
Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005a) have shown the importance of information about the 
future policy path embedded in FOMC statements that do affect financial markets. Two 
usual candidates for the information revealed to private agents by central bank 
communication are signals about policymakers’ views about the current and future state of 
the economy and signals about their reaction function (their objectives and responses to 
them). This paper explores the second dimension which would include, for instance, the 
forward guidance policy and the commitment to deviate from a given policy rule. 
 
Two types of forward guidance policy have been used by central banks so far. The FOMC 
adopted time-contingent commitment from December 2008 to December 2012, when it was 
replaced by a state-contingent commitment conditional on the evolution of the labour 
market. The Bank of England also introduced state-contingent forward guidance conditional 
on unemployment in August 2013. Similarly, the Bank of Japan used state-contingent 
forward guidance conditional on inflation between October 2010 and March 2013. The Bank 
of Canada implemented time-contingent forward guidance between April 2009 and April 
2010, while the Swedish Riksbank during two periods between April 2009 and July 2010 and 
between February 2013 and December 2014. Finally, the ECB implemented time-contingent 
forward guidance without referring to an end date or a precise period of time. 
 
However, an announcement that interest rates will remain low is ambiguous: it may reflect 
an anticipation of bad economic fundamentals or an anticipation of a more accommodative 
monetary policy.1 In the absence of non-nested information sets, forward guidance is a pure 
                                                      
1 Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010), Hubert and Maule (2016) and Melosi (2016) analyse situations where monetary 
policy decisions signal central bank’s information to the private sector. 
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commitment mechanism: a promise by the central bank to keep future policy rates lower 
than its policy rule suggests. Campbell et al. (2012) introduced the distinction between 
Delphic and Odyssean forward guidance. The former describes the central bank 
communication about future macroeconomic fundamentals while the latter consists of 
statements that bind policymakers to future courses of action. They suggest for the US that 
the market participants’ interpretation of FOMC’s announcements is Delphic. Campbell et al. 
(2016) show that responses of private expectations to movements in policy rates on FOMC 
announcement days can be attributed in part to Delphic forward guidance. Odyssean 
forward guidance remains a possibility as a large fraction of futures rates' variability on 
announcement days remains unexplained. Andrade, Gaballo, Mengus and Mojon (2015) find 
that forward guidance reduces the dispersion of professional forecasts for interest rates but 
has no effect on their dispersion for output or inflation. Bletzinger and Wieland (2016) 
analyse whether the ECB forward guidance follows the outcome of a simple policy rule, so is 
only about transparency, or deviates from it, signalling a more accommodating policy stance. 
 
These communication policies have given rise to an abundant theoretical literature. 
Carlstrom, Fuerst, and Paustian (2015), Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015), McKay, 
Nakamura, and Steinsson (2015) and Kiley (2016) focus on optimal monetary policy under 
Odyssean guidance and its macroeconomic effects. Bassetto (2015) studies the optimal 
communication of central banks’ forward guidance policies and the resulting cheap talk 
problems. Gavin, Keen, Richter and Throckmorton (2014) show that the accomodative effect 
of forward guidance is offset by the underlying central bank predictions of near-term 
economic growth, while Gaballo (2016) documents that imperfect information reduces the 
efficiency of forward guidance. Boneva, Harrison and Waldron (2015) analyse the benefits of 
threshold-based forward guidance to stimulate the economy, as an insurance against the 
asymmetric effects of shocks and a credible announcement.  
 
On the empirical side, the evidence about how forward guidance policies impact the 
macroeconomy is rather homogenous. Gertler and Karadi (2015), Bundick and Smith (2016), 
Ben Zeev, Gunn, and Khan (2015) and D'Amico and King (2016) find that real activity and 
prices decline after a positive forward guidance shock. Gertler and Karadi (2015) also find 
that the response of long-term interest rates cannot be explained by the expected path of 
short rates, which should be the main channel through which forward guidance operates. 
The transmission channels of forward guidance and in particular the horizons at which it 
would lower expected future interest rates are much less documented. The objective of this 
paper is then to quantify the effect of forward guidance on policy expectations. 
 
This paper is therefore also related to the literature assessing the value of publishing interest 
rate forecasts, a form of forward guidance, and to the literature about the predictability of 
future policy decisions.2 Rudebush and Williams (2008) show that publication of interest rate 
projections better aligns the expectations of the public and the central bank. Andersson and 
Hofmann (2009) assess whether the publication in New Zealand of the central bank interest 
rate path enhances the central bank ability to influence expectations. Moessner and Nelson 
(2008) find that providing forecasts of future policy rates does not lead private agents to 
systematically overweight policy rate guidance. Mirkov and Natvik (2016) find that, in New 
Zealand and Norway, announced interest rate paths have explanatory power for current 
policy decisions. Moessner (2015) find that FOMC policy rate guidance announcements led 
to a significant reduction in real yields, but that breakeven inflation rates were not affected. 
                                                      
2 Jansen and De Haan (2009), Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010), Middeldorp (2011), Sturm and De Haan (2011) have 
analyzed how other forms of central bank communication may help predict future policy decisions. 
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Raskin (2013) shows that date-based guidance led to a change in market perceptions of the 
FOMC’s reaction function. Svensson (2015) documents mixed outcomes in Sweden and New 
Zealand, about whether the market has anticipated the published policy rate path (its 
predictability) and whether market expectations line up with the path after publication (its 
credibility). Filardo and Hofmann (2014) show that forward guidance has reduced the 
volatility of near-term expectations of the future path of policy rates, but that the effects on 
the level of interest rate expectations are less clear. Kool and Thornton (2014) test whether 
forward guidance improved market participants’ ability to forecast future short-term and 
long-term rates, and find small, often insignificant, results. 
 
Because private-sector decisions and the transmission channel of forward guidance depend 
on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current short-term 
rate, this paper investigates the effect of forward guidance on the term structure of policy 
expectations. We use the same high-frequency methodology as the literature about the 
impact of macroeconomic news and policy announcements on financial market variables (see 
e.g. Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2005b, or Swanson and Williams, 2014). We estimate the 
effect of ECB forward guidance announcements on revisions in private beliefs about future 
policy, i.e. changes in private short-term interest rate expectations at maturities from 1 month 
to 10 years ahead, measured with Overnight Indexed Swaps (OIS). As common with 
financial variables and because of evidence of “volatility clustering”, we use an 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model developed by Engle (1982) to 
properly account for the presence of heteroskedasticity. We estimate the dynamic effects 
using the local projections method of Jorda (2005).  
 
We find that ECB forward guidance announcements have decreased the full term structure 
of private short-term interest rate expectations. The result is stronger on longer maturities 
and is persistent. The result is robust to different estimation models (GARCH or TARCH), to 
different estimation windows, and to controlling for the inclusion of ECB and private 
macroeconomic forecasts in the empirical specification. The latter test suggests that the effect 
of these announcements is more about the stance of future policy than about revealing 
macroeconomic information. This is consistent with the sign of the effect of forward 
guidance announcement: while the statement is about keeping interest rates at “present or 
lower levels”, the effect on policy expectations is strongly negative. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 the 
empirical strategy, section 4 the estimates. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
Our dependent variables are the different maturities, from 1-month to 10-year, of 3-month 
Eonia OIS for the euro area as they are good proxies of expectations of future short-term 
interest rates. OIS are instruments that allow financial institutions to swap the interest rates 
they are paying without having to refinance or change the terms of loans they have taken 
from other financial institutions. Typically, when two financial institutions create an OIS, one 
of the institutions is swapping a floating interest rate and the other institution is swapping a 
fixed short-term interest rate at a given maturity. Under absence of arbitrage, OIS rates 
reflect risk-adjusted financial market participants’ expectations of the average policy rate 
over the horizon corresponding to the maturity of the swap (for instance, from 6-month to 
10-year in Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012). The data set, collected from Datastream, has a 
daily frequency and, because of data availability across maturities, our sample spans from 
August 2005 to June 2015, so estimates are comparable across the term structure. 
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Following the literature about the impact of macroeconomic news and policy 
announcements on financial market variables, we use a dummy variable taking the value of 
one to single out dates of ECB forward guidance announcements and therefore measure their 
effect. On those days, no other non-standard policy measures were announced, so this 
dummy variable only captures forward guidance announcements and does not capture other 
non-standard policy announcements.3 However, because conventional monetary policy 
decisions are taken the same day as forward guidance communication, our analysis requires 
controlling for the effect of monetary surprises. We follow Kuttner (2001)’s methodology to 
identify monetary policy shocks using changes in the price of futures contracts. For a 
monetary policy event on day d of the month m, the monetary shock can be derived from the 
variation in the rate implied by current-month futures contracts on that day. The price of the 
future being computed as the average monthly rate, the change in the futures rate must be 
augmented by a factor related to the number of days in the month affected by the change. St 
is the unexpected interest rate variation, i.e. the monetary shock, ௠݂,ௗ଴  is the current-month 
futures rate and D is the number of days in the month and d the day of the decision: 
ܵ௧ 	ൌ ஽஽ିௗ ሺ ௠݂,ௗ଴ െ ௠݂,ௗିଵ଴ ሻ         (1) 
 
Our dataset also includes returns of the Eurostoxx50 which could potentially correlate with 
changes in private interest rate expectations. In the same vein, commodity prices and 
financial instability can also explain changes in our dependent variables. We thus include in 
our specification changes in WTI oil prices and the level of a variable capturing financial 
stress in the euro area, the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) interpolated from 
weekly to daily frequency. Finally, we control that changes in our dependent variable are not 
driven by changes in private sentiment by including the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) 
of the European Commission. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 
3.1. Baseline analysis 
 
We use a high-frequency methodology to estimate the effects of forward guidance, which 
consists in focusing on movements in OIS in a narrow window around ECB meetings. The 
key assumption is that the reaction of interest rate expectations that are continually affected 
by various factors can be specifically attributed to monetary policy news on the day of the 
policy announcement, or said differently that there is no other macroeconomic news during 
that window. Since interest rate expectations adjust in real-time to news about the 
macroeconomy, movements in interest rate expectations during the window of a policy 
announcement only reflect the effect of news about monetary policy. This is crucial for 
identification since it strips out the endogenous variation in interest rate expectations 
associated with other shocks than monetary news. 
 
As common with financial variables, the variance of our dependent variables changes over 
time. We therefore use an ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity) model to 
treat heteroskedasticity as a variance to be properly modelled and take into account this 
“volatility clustering”. The estimated equations are the following: 
∆ݎ௧,௠ா   = β0 + β 1 FGt + β 2 St + β 3 Mt + εt , εt ~ (0,	ߪ௧ଶ)                       (2) 
ߪ௧ଶ   = ߛ଴ + ∑ ߛ௜	ߝ௧ି௜ଶ௣௜ୀଵ                  (3) 
                                                      
3 The one of July 4th 2013 is available at: www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130704.en.html and 
the one of January 9th 2014 at www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2014/html/is140109.en.html. 
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where  ∆ݎ௧,௛ா   is the change between t and t-1 in euro area interest rate expectations for 
horizon m, FGt is the ECB forward guidance dummy, St is monetary surprises à la Kuttner 
(2001), and Mt is a vector of controls including the CISS, the Eurostoxx50 returns, oil price 
daily variations and the ESI index. The number of lags p in the variance equation is 
determined by their significance and set to one.4 We are particularly interested in the β1 
coefficient which should be interpreted as the effect of ECB forward guidance on revisions of 
interest rate expectations controlling for the monetary decision and some other financial 
developments captured by the Mt vector that might have potentially occurred the same days. 
 
3.2. Dynamic analysis 
 
We also investigate the dynamic effects of forward guidance and assess how persistent are 
the effects of these announcements. We use the local projections method of Jorda (2005). 
Impulse response functions obtained from VARs may be imposing excessive restrictions on 
the endogenous dynamics, so that estimates derived from more flexible approaches as local 
projections, might be preferable. Another advantage is the robustness of local projections to 
model misspecification to estimate dynamic responses to exogenous shocks. 
 
Considering that exogenous shocks have been identified beforehand, Jorda (2005) suggests 
estimating a set of regressions representing the impulse response of the dependent variable 
at the horizon h to a given exogenous shock ߳௧ at time t: 
ݕ௧ା௛ ൌ ߙ௛ ൅ ߚ௛߳௧ ൅ ߶௛ሺܮሻܺ௧ ൅ ߟ௧ା௛	    (4) 
 
where ݕ௧ା௛ is the dependent variable at the horizon h, ߳௧ represents the given exogenous 
shock,  ߶௛ሺܮሻ is a polynomial lag operator, and Xt is a vector of control variables. In our case, 
rather than using OLS, we estimate the ARCH model of equations (2)-(3) so that the variable 
of interest is ∆ݎ௧,௠ா  the daily change in euro area interest rate expectations for horizon h, the 
exogenous shock is the forward guidance variable FGt and the vector Xt encompasses the 
vectors St and Mt from equation (2) and ߟ௧ା௛is estimated as in equation (3).  
 
4. Estimates 
 
We assess the impact of ECB forward guidance on interest rate expectations at horizons 1, 3, 
6 and 9 months, and 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 years. Our estimation sample starts in August 2005 so 
we have 2576 observations for each maturity. Table 1 shows the benchmark results. The β1 
coefficient associated with forward guidance announcements is negative and significant for 
horizons from 9 months to 5 years ahead. The peak effect is on the latter maturities. For 
instance, FG announcements decreased by 5 basis points private interest rate expectations at 
the 3-year horizon. The β2 coefficient associated with monetary surprises is positive and 
significant from horizons 1 month to 3 years ahead indicating that a restrictive monetary 
shock at date t increase future expected interest rates. These results show that ECB forward 
guidance announcements decreased private short-term interest rate expectations at 
maturities around the medium-run, consistently with the horizon of these announcements.  
 
We estimate various alternative specifications in Table 2 to assess the robustness of the 
baseline result. First, we focus on the two dates of forward guidance announcements 
separately. The effect of the first announcement is significant and negative at all maturities. 
The effect of the second announcement is much smaller. Second, we test an alternative 
                                                      
4 We assess the sensitivity of the results to this choice in the robustness section. 
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ARCH specification with four lags in the variance equation or alternative estimation 
methods such as TARCH and GARCH models. Threshold ARCH enables to take into 
account the asymmetric nature of positive and negative innovations: positive and negative 
shocks have a different effect on volatility. On financial markets, downward movements 
(“bad news”) are followed by higher market volatility than upward movements (“good 
news”). GARCH models enable to take into account the variance of lagged residuals in the 
variance equation. All three specifications confirm the previous result. 
 
Third, because forward guidance announcements may be interpreted a signal of a bad 
economic outlook (Delphic), we assess whether controlling for the central bank 
macroeconomic information set (measured with ECB projections) modifies the baseline 
results. The ECB/Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area are 
produced quarterly since June 2004. They are published in March, June, September and 
December and are presented as ranges for annual percentage changes in inflation and real 
GDP. We also control for private agents’ macroeconomic information set. The ECB’s SPF is a 
quarterly survey of expectations of inflation, real GDP growth and unemployment in the 
euro area. Participants are experts affiliated with financial or non- financial institutions. SPF 
forecasts are produced in February, May, August and November. We also test whether 
including changes in an ECB shadow rate or US Kuttner (2001)’s monetary surprises 
modifies our estimation. We include the shadow rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2016) as an 
overall measure of the monetary policy stance representing both conventional and 
unconventional tools in the interest rate space. Because Kuttner surprises are based on 
reactions from market participants to policy announcements, they may capture some of the 
reaction to forward guidance, so we test the effect of removing them. We also test whether 
removing controls modifies the estimation. The effect of forward guidance announcements 
remains negative and significant in all cases. Fourth, although this goes against the very 
objective of high-frequency studies of isolating an event from others and should reduce the 
precision of the estimation, we increase the window over which we assess the response of 
changes in interest rate expectations from t+1 to t+4. All four estimations show a negative 
effect, and this effect is at work on longer maturities when the window widens. 
 
Finally, Figure 1 plots the results from estimating the dynamic effects, over the following 20 
business days, of forward guidance announcements on 9-month, 1-, 2-, 3-, 5- and 10-year 
OIS.5 Estimates show that the effect of forward guidance announcements on maturities until 
1 year is small. Starting from the 2-year maturity to the 10-year one, the cumulated effect is 
stronger, highly persistent and tends to increase.  The effect is also stronger with maturities. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper tests the effect of ECB forward guidance announcements on private short-term 
interest rate expectations using a high-frequency methodology and an ARCH model, 
complemented with local projections. We find that forward guidance announcements 
decrease the full term structure of private short-term interest rate expectations. This result is 
stronger on longer maturities and persistent. Controlling for ECB and private 
macroeconomic information sets in the empirical specification does not alter the negative 
effect of ECB forward guidance announcement on policy expectations. This suggests that the 
effect of these announcements is more about the stance of future ECB monetary policy than 
about signalling a bad macroeconomic outlook.  
                                                      
5 Results for other maturities are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 1: Baseline estimates 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to 
equations (1) and (2) for a different horizon.  
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oieur1m oieur3m oieur6m oieur9m oieur1y oieur2y oieur3y oieur5y oieur10y
FG -0.004 -0.002 -0.011 -0.019** -0.021** -0.033** -0.050** -0.054* -0.009
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
kutt_eonia 0.284*** 0.450*** 0.517*** 0.545*** 0.557*** 0.478*** 0.312*** 0.172 0.038
[0.09] [0.07] [0.11] [0.14] [0.17] [0.17] [0.11] [0.11] [0.10]
ciss -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002* -0.002* -0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
r_euro50 0.001 0.001* 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
oil 0.001 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
esi 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
constant 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
arch(1) 1.237*** 1.000*** 0.825*** 0.745*** 0.465*** 0.387*** 0.246*** 0.192*** 0.180***
[0.27] [0.27] [0.20] [0.21] [0.12] [0.09] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04]
constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
N 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576 2576
Mean Equation
Variance equation
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Table 2: Robustness analysis 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Each column corresponds to 
equations (1) and (2) for a different horizon.  
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
oieur1m oieur3m oieur6m oieur9m oieur1y oieur2y oieur3y oieur5y oieur10y
FG 04/07/2013 -0.009*** -0.004* -0.024*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.057*** -0.085*** -0.090*** -0.045***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FG 09/01/2014 0.001 0.001 0.002*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.012***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
FG -0.010*** -0.003* -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016 -0.025 -0.022 -0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
FG -0.004 -0.002 -0.012 -0.020** -0.021** -0.034** -0.051** -0.054* -0.008
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
FG -0.012*** -0.003 -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.027** -0.041* -0.045 -0.007
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
FG 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.015** -0.018** -0.030* -0.042* -0.049* 0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
FG -0.004 -0.002 -0.01 -0.019** -0.021** -0.033** -0.049* -0.051* -0.003
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04]
FG -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 -0.019** -0.021** -0.033** -0.051** -0.054* -0.009
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
FG -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.023* -0.025** -0.036* -0.052* -0.055* -0.009
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
FG -0.003 0.000 -0.008* -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.035** -0.041** -0.004
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
FG -0.002 -0.006* -0.010* -0.023** -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.057*** -0.049* 0.008
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
FG -0.008*** -0.006** -0.009* -0.021** -0.029*** -0.050*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.030
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02]
FG 0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.014 -0.028 -0.066* -0.092*** -0.044***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] [0.00]
FG -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.003 0.000 -0.018 -0.046** -0.068*** -0.014
[0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
ΔrE between t+4 and t-1
ΔrE between t+3 and t-1
ΔrE between t+2 and t-1
Two dummies
GARCH(1,1)
TARCH(1,1)
ARCH(4)
Including US FFR Kuttner surprises
Including the EA shadow rate
ΔrE between t+1 and t-1
Including ECB and SPF forecasts
Removing Kuttner surprises
Removing controls
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Figure 1: Local projection estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Impulse responses to a Forward Guidance announcement, over the following 20 business days, 
estimated with equations (2)-(3) using local projections as described in equation (4) with 90 per cent 
confidence intervals and the cumulated effect of horizon specific estimates. 
 
